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Abstract
We present evidence about the eects of dismissals-for-cause requirements, a specic
component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. We
study a quasi-natural experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the
12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for
cause, eight did not apply to small rms. Using matched employer-employee longitudinal
data and dierence-in-dierences methods, we examine the impact of that dierentiated
change in ring costs upon several variables over a long period of time. In our results,
we do not nd robust evidence of eects on job or worker 
ows, although some estimates
suggest a slight increase in hirings. On the other hand, rms that gain 
exibility in their
dismissals exhibit consistently slower wage growth and sizeable increases in their relative
performance. Our ndings suggest that reducing ring costs of the type studied here
increase workers' eort and reduce their bargaining power.
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11 Introduction
Employment protection legislation (EPL) tends to be studied from the point of view of the
constraints imposed upon rms that want to adjust their workforces as a response to eco-
nomic shocks (Lazear 1990, Bertola 1990, Hopenhayn & Rogerson 1993, Bertola & Rogerson
1997). This approach is justied as many dimensions of EPL, such as the rules regarding
the termination of permanent contracts, collective dismissals, or the regulation of temporary
contracts, may create important barriers against job and worker reallocation prompted by
economic 
uctuations. Such barriers can therefore aect the eciency of labour markets and
have important welfare consequences.
However, rms may also need to adjust their workforces for other reasons than economic
shocks. A major alternative reason - but also a much less studied one - concerns dismissals
for cause, which are driven instead by worker performance or disciplinary issues. EPL can
also play an important role here, given the moral hazard problems that arise when workers
are protected against rings. Such problems can be considerable, particularly if severance
payments are large enough (Blanchard & Tirole 2003) and/or rms face liquidity constraints.1
In this paper, we examine the causal impact of the administrative procedures that restrict
rings for cause. As far as we know, we are the rst to examine empirically the role of this
specic component of EPL. Our analysis is based on a quasi-natural experiment that occurred
in Portugal, a country well known for its very strict EPL (Blanchard & Portugal 2001, OECD
2004, Botero et al. 2004). Specically, the experiment results from a new law governing
employee dismissals introduced in 1989, under which ring constraints were reduced for all
rms. However, rms employing 20 or fewer employees (unlike larger rms) were exempted
from a number of administrative restrictions regarding dismissals for cause. Moreover, since
until then there was no dierentiation in ring constraints across rms in terms of their size
or other characteristics, one can set up a dierence-in-dierences analysis, by contrasting the
outcomes of `smaller' and `larger' rms, before and after 1989.
As we draw on particularly detailed matched employer-employee panel data, we are able
1In many countries, rms need to go through costly administrative procedures when they dismiss for cause.
These procedures include notice periods, notications and/or approval of third parties, law-mandated retraining
or replacement prior to dismissal, culminating in some cases in compulsory worker reinstatements. For instance,
in Germany, employers must notify the employees they want to dismiss and their work councils in writing, after
oral or written warnings to employee. If the work councils disagree with the employers' intentions, dismissal
has to wait for a decision by the employment court, which can take several months. In South Korea, employers
need to send advance notice to the unions 60 days prior to dismissal and consult with them over eorts to
avoid dismissal. See OECD (2004) and Botero et al. (2004) for more examples.
2to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the impact of the new law, by considering many variables
that typically have only been studied separately before. We examine not only employment
and job and worker 
ows (Oyer & Schaefer (2000), Acemoglu & Angrist (2001), Blanchard
& Portugal (2001), Autor (2003), Kugler & Saint-Paul (2004), Boeri & Jimeno (2005), Autor
et al. (2006), Varejao & Portugal (2007), Bauer et al. (2007), Kugler & Pica (2008), Marinescu
(2008)), but also productivity (Besley & Burgess 2004, Autor et al. 2007) and wages (Leonardi
& Pica 2007). These variables are particularly interesting, not only from the point of view of
policy but also that of theory as, at least in the cases of wages and productivity, the theoretical
impacts of ring costs have proved ambiguous. Furthermore, we examine the eects of lower
dismissal costs on each variable over a particularly long period of time, in order to shed light
on possible dierences between the short- and the long-run.
We also complement our initial dierence-in-dierences results with a propensity score
matching analysis. Although we already control for rm time-invariant heterogeneity by
drawing on the longitudinal dimension of the data, the propensity score matching approach
minimises any remaining bias driven by unobserved dierences and by dierences in the com-
mon support across the two rm types and their workers (Heckman et al. 1998), particularly
in the case of the type of data used here (Heckman et al. 1997).
Finally, we pay particular attention to the robustness of our results. First, we consider
dierent samples, either a subset of rms that are likely to have reached a `stable' size over
the years preceding the reform; or a more comprehensive set of rms, assigned into the
treatment or control groups depending solely on their size in the last year before the reform
was introduced. Second, we consider articial size thresholds, in which we reestimate all
results assuming the law had dictated a dierent size threshold. This analysis seeks to assess
the possibility that our results are picking up phenomena related to rm size that just happen
to coincide with the specic law reform studied in the paper. Third, we consider dierent
subsets of the data and dierent matching methods.
Our results prove to be resilient to these dierent robustness tests, particularly when
considering the dierence-in-dierences matching approach. While we do not nd robust
evidence of eects on job or worker 
ows - although some estimates suggest an increase in
hirings -, our results indicate that the performance of rms that gain 
exibility in terms
of dismissals improves considerably. Moreover, we also nd that the wages paid by those
3rms grow more slowly than the wages of rms that have not obtained greater 
exibility in
dismissing workers. According to our theoretical discussion, these results are consistent with
models involving moral hazard and wage bargaining models.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, Section 2 presents some of the main features
of the legislative reform examined here and discusses its likely impact according to economic
theory. We then introduce our data set in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main results and
Section 5 describes the robustness analyses. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The law reform and its theoretical impact
2.1 The 1989 employment law reform
After the 1974 coup d'etat that overthrew a 48-year-old conservative dictatorship, Portuguese
politics became dominated by socialist ideas. Many rms were nationalised, especially those
rms in sectors considered `strategic' (utilities, banking, insurance, transports, media, etc);
the control of the largest farms were transferred from owners to employees; price controls were
introduced in many markets; and several new laws that regulated economic activity came into
force. Amongst the several markets that became subject to tighter government intervention,
the labour market was particularly hardly hit.
The foremost example of the labour market restrictions imposed at the time was the law
that regulated dismissals, Decreto-Lei 372-A/75, introduced in 1975. As in the employment
laws of other countries, the 1975 Portuguese law also indicated that permanent labour con-
tracts could be terminated only when the worker was of retirement age or if the worker was
red for cause. However, unlike many other countries, cause was dened in a particularly
restrictive way. Specically, cause existed only when it was \absolutely and denitively im-
possible, in the present and in the future, for the worker to perform his/her job or for the
rm to take the worker's labour" (article 8). Moreover, for a rm to re a worker for cause, it
would also need to conduct a particularly lengthy administrative procedure, which included,
amongst several other procedures, writing a detailed document to be sent to the worker and
to the worker's union outlining why the rm wanted to re the worker. A rm should also
collect evidence from a potentially very large number of witnesses indicated by the employee.
It is important to underline that if any formal aspect of this time-consuming administrative
procedure were not pursued and if the dismissed worker subsequently challenged the legality
4of his/her dismissal, then the court would most likely declare the dismissal as illegal. In that
case, the court would also order the rm to reinstate the worker and to pay him/her all wages
corresponding to the period since the worker was unlawfully dismissed until the worker was
reinstated. Even if the dismissal was deemed legal or if the legality of the dismissal was not
challenged by the employee, the rm was still always obliged to pay severance benets. These
benets were considerable, as they corresponded to one month of pay per year of tenure, with
a minimum of three months of pay.
After about ten years of relative economic stagnation that followed the 1974 coup d'etat,
Portuguese economic policy eventually became more market friendly. Under the governments
of the mid- and late-1980s, several reforms envisaging more 
exible product and factor markets
were introduced. Moreover, in 1986, the country became a member of the European Commu-
nity, after which capital in
ows increased substantially. Under this positive economic context,
a new employment law sought to revert or, at least, attenuate the very restrictive conditions
governing the termination of permanent contracts described above. After a period of heated
political debate, public demonstrations (including a general strike), and detailed scrutiny by
the constitutional court - all events which generated considerable uncertainty about whether
the intended reforms would indeed come through - a new law, Decreto-Lei 64-A/89, nally
came into force at the end of May of 1989.2
This new law softened considerably the dismissal constraints faced by rms, namely by
widening the range of circumstances in which a rm could re a worker employed under a
permanent contract. Unlike under the old law, it became possible for rms to re a worker
because of structural, technological or business-cycle reasons. However, while the benchmark
administrative procedure required for dismissals for cause remained lengthy and complex, the
new law allowed small rms (dened as those rms employing 20 or fewer workers) to follow
a much simpler procedure. In particular, out of the 12 specic rules that larger rms needed
to follow (each rule outlined in a separate paragraph of article 10 of the 1989 law), only four
of those rules needed to be considered by smaller rms (article 15).3 This dierentiation
established an important contrast between the new and old laws, as rm size was irrelevant
in the 1975 document.
2Cavaco Silva (1995) provides an analysis of this and other reforms introduced in Portugal from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s.
3The only exception to this streamlined procedure for smaller rms was when the worker being dismissed
was a union leader. In this case, the benchmark, 12-paragraph-long procedure applied.
5The aggregate impact of the dierentiation in the law in terms of the size of the rms was
potentially very large, as a considerable number of persons worked in rms employing 20 or
less workers. Our data, described in detail below, which cover the entire population of rms
and their employees, indicate that, in 1989, there were a total of 136,558 rms in Portugal,
of which 120,433 rms (88.2%) employed 20 or less workers. In terms of the total number
of employees in all rms, 2,169,830, a still considerable number of workers, 620,373 (28.6%),
were employed in the smaller rms.
Moreover, the eight paragraphs that did not apply to smaller rms were also particularly
important in terms of their content. First, unlike larger rms, smaller rms did not have to
discuss (and to be able to prove that they had discussed) the motives for the dismissal with
the worker that they wanted to re. Second, smaller rms were not required to inquire any
witnesses indicated by the worker. Third, unions did not have to be involved in the dismissal
process. Finally, again unlike rms with more than 20 employees, smaller rms were not
required to write a document detailing the entire dismissal process. Larger rms would have
to present this document in court if the employee challenged the legality of his/her dismissal,
lest the ring was declared invalid.4
Although most of these dierences between smaller and larger rms have a strong formal
dimension, one should underline that, according to both the pre- and post-1989 laws, courts
were forced to declare a dismissal as null even if only one of these formal steps had not been
undertaken.5 Moreover, again according to both the pre- and post-1989 laws, void dismissals
implied the reinstatement of the worker in the rm and the payment of all foregone wages since
the time when the worker was unlawfully dismissed until the nal court decision. Furthermore,
it was not uncommon that employment courts took one year or longer to reach their verdict,
a fact that further compounded the liabilities faced by rms.6
Finally, it is important to refer that other adjustments in employment law were also
introduced in 1989 or soon after. The two most relevant additional reforms involved the
4In order to obtain additional evidence that rms have paid attention to these dierences in the law,
we contacted representatives of employer organisations of two selected industries: building and retail. These
industries were selected as they include large numbers of rms of small size. Both representatives have conrmed
that rms in their industries were aware of the new law and its specic element studied in this paper (the 20-
employee threshold) at the time the law was introduced.
5The emphasis upon formality is also common in the civil law legal systems of many other European and
developing countries. Voiding the dismissal if at least one formal requirement was not followed by the rm is
probably meant to oer additional protection to employees.
6Galdon-Sanchez & Guell (2004) study the court outcomes of dismissal con
icts using data from four
European countries and the US.
6tightening of temporary contracts (which were restricted to a narrower range of employment
relationships than before 1989) and the easening of collective dismissals. Other new legal
diplomas in employment law covered child work, health and safety practices and strikes.
Unlike with dismissals for cause, the tighter temporary contracts did not change in a dierent
way for rms of dierent sizes. However, it is not impossible that smaller rms had a dierent
percentage of their workforces made up of temporary contracts and that may confound the
assessment of the main reform. On the other hand, collective dismissals were easened in a
slightly dierent way for rms of dierent sizes. Firms employing less than 50 employees were
from 1989 allowed to conduct a collective dismissal involving only two employees, while for
rms employing 50 or more employees a collective dismissal required that at least ve workers
were laid-o.
In order to minimise any bias in our results related to the changes in temporary contracts
or collective dismissals, we focus our analysis of the impact of the costs of dismissal only on
rms employing a number of workers `suciently' close to the rm size threshold of interest
(20). Moreover, we only consider rms which are `relatively' far from the threshold that
applied for collective dismissals (50). Specically, in our benchmark results, we consider only
rms employing between 10 and 30 workers up to May 1989 (when the new dismissals law
came into force). This relatively narrow range of rm sizes also implies that any biases related
to dierences in the share of temporary contracts across the two types of rms are likely to be
small. Moreover, our use of matching techniques also helps our identication in this regard,
by restricting our comparison to rms that are eectively comparable along a large set of
observable variables. Finally, the restriction upon the range of rm sizes we consider is also
important in itself, even if there were no asymmetric changes in collective dismissals. In fact,
the assumption of common trends for the treatment and control groups is less likely to hold
for a wider range of rm sizes. This and other methodological issues are described in a more
formal way in the appendix.
2.2 Theoretical predictions
It is well known that the legal procedures surrounding dismissals for cause can induce dead-
weight losses, as some of the costs borne by rms when carrying out such dismissals are not
recouped by the workers aected. Those deadweight losses can then result in ineciently
7low numbers of separations and hirings. Therefore, theory does not oer clear predictions
about the impact of ring costs upon job 
ows, as both hirings and separations will be below
their optimal levels. However, worker 
ows (hirings and/or separations) are unambiguously
expected to fall with dismissal costs.
In the specic case of the law reform studied here, in which the costs of dismissals for
cause fall, some workers that exhibit poor levels of performance but that have been protected
by the law may be dismissed once the new law is in force. At the same time, employers can
also be expected to hire more, as such new matches will no longer be as costly to terminate
as before the 1989 law. However, it is also possible that workers that exhibit poor levels
of performance change their behaviour under the new circumstances created by the law, so
that separations do not necessarily increase. This possibility could also weaken the expected
increase in hirings, to the extent that some of those hirings are carried out to replace dismissed
workers.
Moreover, the threshold introduced by the law may attenuate the expected increases in
hirings by smaller rms: if the increase in hirings is large enough, then dismissal rules would
change considerably at the 20-employee threshold - not only for the marginal workers but also
for all the infra-marginal ones. On the other hand, rms above the threshold may be willing
to pay the higher ring costs for a few marginal workers in order to benet from lower ring
costs for all remaining workers when those rms move below the threshold. Consequently,
there is also scope for heterogeneity in terms of costs of adjustment within each side of the
size threshold: rms `considerably' below the threshold would be more likely to expand than
rm `just' below the threshold, while rms `just' above the threshold would be more likely to
dismiss that rms employing `considerably' more than 20 employees.7
We present here preliminary evidence about some of these `threshold eects' by examining
the transition of rms across two main size categories before and after the law reform. Figure
1 describes the percentage of rms of size 10-19 in 1987, 1989 and 1991 that either stay in the
same size category or move to the 21-30 category in 1989, 1991 and 1993, respectively.8 The
gure also presents the percentage of rms of size 21-30 in 1987, 1989 and 1991 that either
stay in the same size category or move to the 10-19 category after a period of two years. The
7Moreover, larger rms will also have incentives to split into smaller rms if economies of scale are not
important; or to resort to outsourcing. See also Schivardi & Torrini (2008).
8The gure draws on data for the entire population of rms (with at least one employee) in Portugal in
each year. The specic details of the longitudinal data set used are presented in the next section.
8evidence in the gure supports our prediction above about fewer transitions from below to
above the threshold and more transitions in the opposite direction, as the percentage of 10-19
rms moving to the 21-30 category declines over time, while the percentage of 21-30 rms
that move to the 10-19 category increases over time. Moreover, we have also found that these
results also hold when examining size transitions over periods longer than two years.
We conclude from this preliminary analysis that at least some of these threshold eects
may indeed be important. However, we defer to Section 4.1 for a more detailed analysis of the
eects of the reform upon employment-related variables, considering also issues of dierences
in rm characteristics and statistical signicance. Moreover, we also present some evidence
about heterogeneity in these threshold eects in Section 5.3, when we examine a wide range
of rm sizes. At this stage, we can already establish that the variety of theoretical aspects
at play - involving varying worker eort and `threshold eects' on top of the more standard
considerations regarding hirings and separations - makes it dicult to predict the net eect
of the new dismissals law upon job and worker 
ows. The variety of theoretical aspects also
makes the empirical analysis of their eects particularly valuable.
With respect to the theoretical eect of the new law in terms of wages, there are two
dierent theoretical models one can appeal to. On the one hand, in a bargaining framework
(Lindbeck & Snower 2001, Autor 2003), lower rings costs will transfer bargaining power from
incumbent workers to their employers, as dismissal threats will carry more weight. Wages will
fall, or at least grow more slowly, potentially by more the greater the surplus in the employer-
employee relationship.
On the other hand, as in the case of the Lazear (1990) framework, the fall in ring costs
will lead to an increase in wages, since competition will no longer drive employers to discount
the wages paid to workers by the amount of the ring costs. However, the Lazear (1990)
model is not particularly well suited in our specic context as that model focuses on the case
of new hires (see also Leonardi & Pica (2007)) while we consider instead the entire workforce
of each rm. This is relevant as rm-specic skills gained by workers with some tenure will
introduce a wedge between their pay and their outside option in the external market whose
size is determined by bargaining. Moreover, while Lazear (1990) assumes that ring costs are
given, the specic dimension of EPL we study here involves ring costs that are dicult to
estimate at the time the worker is hired, although rms could establish their own expectations
9of such costs for each worker and then adjust entry wages correspondingly.
Finally, when considering the eects of ring costs upon rm performance, we nd again
two opposing theoretical views. If ring costs are a suciently important incentive for workers
to invest in rm-specic skills (see Autor (2003)), then rm performance may actually suer
from the reform studied here. In other words, if rms are no longer able to commit to a long-
term employment relationship (for instance if rm-level agreements are dicult to enforce
and therefore lack credibility), then workers will generally nd it less advantageous to invest
in rm-specic skills, which may lead to a deterioration of rm performance.
However, if workers earn rents at their current jobs, then worker eort (and therefore
rm performance) may instead increase when ring costs fall. As it becomes less unlikely
that workers will lose their wage premiums, then, to the extent that eort is observable by
employers, eort will increase and rm performance will improve (see also the discussion in
Autor et al. (2007)). Similarly, improvements in personnel management warranted by the
greater 
exibility of the new law can also be expected to lead to better performance. Firm
performance may increase not only (or not necessarily) because workers exert more eort but
also because uncooperative or disruptive workers are red.9
3 Data
The data used in this paper are derived from `Quadros de Pessoal' (QP), a particularly rich
annual census of all rms that operate in Portugal and that employ at least one worker.
Under the regulations of this census, which is administered by the Ministry of Employment,
each rm is legally required to provide extensive information about itself and also about each
one of its workers that are employed at the census reference month (the reference month is
March up to 1993 and October from 1994 onwards). Given the extensive coverage of the
data, the only groups of workers not present in the data are the self-employed and the public
sector employees, besides the unemployed. Moreover, the period covered by the data is also
9Moreover, while one can argue that employers can always bargain with workers over a compensation
payment large enough for the latter to accept to quit, adverse selection problems may make such approach
particularly costly for rms: if workers to be red have worse outside options, they are likely to demand
higher compensation payments. Furthermore, if rms circumvent the constraints imposed by EPL by making
compensation payments to workers that underperform or that have disciplinary problems, that may undermine
worker morale (Bewley 1999) and reduce the levels of eort of the remaining workforce. One can argue that
the stringency of the legal procedures surrounding dismissals for cause also determine, albeit indirectly, the
minimum level of eort that employees need to exert to keep their jobs.
10relatively long, as the census has been ongoing since 1982.10
The long list of variables available in the data includes unique identiers for each rm,
for each establishment and for each employee. These identiers allow us to follow workers
over time, even if they move between rms. Other rm-level variables are the economic
sector/industry (measured at the ve-digit level), region (up to 400 dierent units), number
of employees (constructed from the worker-level data), rm age, type of ownership (public,
private/domestic or foreign owned), sales, and equity. At the worker-level, the data make
available information about schooling, age (month and year when the worker was born),
gender, tenure (month and year when the worker was hired by the rm), occupation (ve-
digit code), wages, hours worked, job level (a two-digit variable, comparable across rms and
over time) and promotions (month and year when the worker was last promoted in the rm).
Experience is constructed as age   education   6.
There are several wage variables, all of them expressed in monthly values (the most com-
mon frequency of pay in Portugal), including base wages, tenure-related payments, overtime
pay, `subsidies' and `other payments' (including bonuses and prot- or performance-related
pay). All wages have been de
ated using Portugal's CPI and are expressed in 2004 euros.
There is also information about normal hours and overtime hours per month. The benchmark
measure of pay adopted in this study is based on the sum of all ve types of pay divided by
the sum of the two types of hours worked, resulting in a measure of total real hourly pay.
Based on the rm- and the worker-level data, we construct job and worker 
ow variables
following Davis et al. (1996a). Each 
ow rate is obtained by dividing a given 
ow by the
average employment of the rm over the two periods analysed. Specically, the job creation
rate is dened as JCt =
Lt Lt 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), if Lt >= Lt 1, or JCt = 0, if Lt < Lt 1, in which
Lt denotes the number of workers in period t. Similarly, the job destruction rate is dened
as JDt =
Lt 1 Lt
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), if Lt <= Lt 1, or JDt = 0, if Lt > Lt 1. Moreover, the net job
creation rate (NJCRt) corresponds to JCt JDt and the job reallocation rate (JRt) is equal
to JCt + JDt.
In terms of worker 
ows, the hiring rate is Ht =
Hiringst;t 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), in which Hiringst;t 1
denotes the number of workers employed by the rm in period t but not in period t   1, and
the separation rate is St =
Separationst;t 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1) , in which Separationst;t 1 denotes the number of
10However, only employer-level data is available for the year of 1990. Overall, on average, between 1982 and
2004, there are approximately 2.5 million workers and more than 200,000 rms per year.
11workers employed by the rm in the period t   1 but nor in period t.11 Finally, the worker
reallocation rate (WRt) is Ht + St, and the churning rate (CRt), a measure of `excessive
turnover' (Burgess et al. 2000), is dened here as WRt   JRt.
As to the sample used in the paper, our benchmark results are based on rms with sizes
ranging between 10 and 30 employees in 1989 (the 1989 data refers to March, before the new
law about rings came into force, which occurred only in May). Such range of rm sizes seems
appropriate as we want to use a sample including only rms that are very similar, except that
their sizes are slightly dierent. Moreover, any results based on a wider range could also be
aected by the new law about collective dismissals, which changed dierently for rms larger
or smaller than 50 employees (see Section 2.1). We also drop rms employing exactly 20
workers, the threshold level in the new dismissals law, as it may have been unclear if such
rms belong to the treatment or the control groups (although, strictly speaking, rms with
20 employees would be in the `treatment' group). Furthermore, rm size will also typically

uctuate over time, even if only slightly, which would possibly make it risky to assign rms
with 20 employees to the control or to the treatment groups. Our denition of size is based
only on paid employees, excluding other types of workers (employers, unpaid family workers
and other residual categories).12
One concern when selecting the sample of interest is mean reversion or the `regression
falacy' (Davis et al. 1996a,b), as selecting rms into the treatment or control groups based
upon size in a single year only could bias our results. In fact, such assignment imply that
some rms in the small (large) size category correspond to rms that are typically of a larger
(smaller) size but that had had a relatively bad (good) year in that period. These rms
would tend to switch back to their `permanent' size after 1989, thus potentially distorting our
analysis.
In order to address this problem, we construct a sample made up of rms that are likely to
have reached their `permanent' size by 1989. Specically, we restrict our sample to rms that
remain in the same size category, between 10 and 19 workers or between 21 and 30 workers,
11We calculate hirings by considering the information about the the year and the month in which each
worker is hired and we calculate separations using the identity Lt Lt 1  Hiringst;t 1 Separationst;t 1 ,
Separationst;t 1  Hiringst;t 1 (Lt Lt 1) rather than by comparing individual identiers between periods
t 1 and t. The reason for this choice is that we believe there is less scope for measurement error in the tenure
data than in the individual identiers (the latter have to be compared over two periods while the former need
to be considered in only one period).
12See Cabral & Mata (2003) for an analysis of the distribution of rm sizes also based on the `Quadros de
Pessoal' data.
12over a period of three years up to 1989. Initially, we nd 16,267 rms that employ 10-19 or
21-30 workers in 1987, while in 1988 and 1989, the equivalent numbers of rms are 17,565
and 18,964, respectively. When restricting the sample to rms present in the data in all three
years and that remain in the same size category over the period (i.e. that are always `small'
or `large' from 1987 to 1989), we obtain 7,480 dierent rms, of which 5,863 are `small'.13 In
terms of their observable characteristics, some noteworthy dierences between the two groups
of rms include worker reallocation rates (an average of 0.37 for smaller rms and of 0.33 for
larger rms in the 1989 data) and hourly pay (2.72 euros per hour for smaller rms and 2.96
for larger rms, again in the 1989 data) - see Table 1 for a list of descriptive statistics for each
type of rms.
The 7,480 rms considered employed 122,062 individuals in 1989. This is also the year in
which the total number of employees of those selected rms peaks, although the equivalent
numbers for 1987 and 1988 are very similar (119,401 and 121,561, respectively) - see Table
2.14
For the benet of robustness, we also present evidence of the transitions between size
categories for the benchmark sample used in the paper, following our analysis in Section 2.2.
Similarly to the case of Figure 1, Figure 2 indicates that the percentage of rms of size 10-19
(21-30) in 1989 and 1991 that either stay in the same size category or move to the 21-30
(10-19) category after a period of two years. The evidence there is again consistent with our
theoretical predictions, as 10-19 rms are less likely to move into the 21-30 category while 21-
30 rms are more likely to move to the 10-19 category. (By construction, there is no mobility
across size categories in 1987.)
4 Results
In this section, we present our results regarding the impact of the lower ring costs in terms of
job and worker 
ows, wages and rm performance. Our estimations are based on dierence-in-
1344% of these rms are present in all years from 1986 to 1999, the period we cover in our data. That is also
by far the most common time pattern in the data, as the second most common pattern, comprising rms that
are present ininterrumptly from 1986 to 1993, includes only 4% of all rms.
14The lowest number of employees is found in the last period covered, 1999, although by then the number
of rms has also fallen considerably, from 7,480 to to 4,866, due to rm exits (and no rm entry, by denition
from our sample construction criteria). While rm sizes range, again by construction, between 10 and 30
workers between 1987 and 1989, the range of the size variable is larger in 1986 and in the years after 1989.
For instance, in 1999, 32% of the rms remaining employ less than 10 employees (the lower threshold for the
1987-89 period), while 10% employ more than 30 employees (the upper threshold in the 1987-89 period).
13dierences regressions on longitudinal data, following the discussion on identication presented
in the Appendix (Section A). In particular, we estimate the following equation:
Yit = Di + 0Zi + "it; (1)
in which Y is the dependent variable of interest (job and worker 
ows, wages or rm
performance), Yit = Yit   Yi;89 (t = 1991;92;:::;99), Di is a dummy equal to 1 if the rm
employs less than 20 workers in 1989 (and 0 otherwise) and Zi is a vector of control variables.
These control variables, all measured in 1989, are: schooling (average level of schooling of
all employees in the rm), experience, tenure, gender (percentage of women amongst all
the employees in the rm), hourly pay, hours worked, job level (average job level across all
workers, ranked from level 1, top managers, to level 9, apprentices), foreign ownership (a
dummy variable taking value one if 50% or more of the rm is owned by foreign investors),
and rm age. We also consider the squares and the cubes of each one of these variables for
the year of 1989 and the rst and second lags of all the linear terms of the 1989 variables, rm
type dummies (based on dierences in their legal structure; 5 categories), sector dummies
(28) and region dummies (also 28).
The tables and gures presented below report the estimates and the standard errors of 
(robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level). The samples used for each
estimation are either a single year in the `after' period (1991-1999) or the pooled analysis of
periods 1991-1995, 1996-1999 or 1991-1999.
4.1 Job and worker 
ows
The main version of the net job creation variable used measures net job creation in each year
from 1991 to 1999.15 We present our results in Table 3 and Figure 3 (dotted line).
We nd evidence that small rms, those subject to a greater decrease in their ring costs,
exhibit a moderate increase in net job creation, particularly in the second part of the 1990s
(coecient of 0.011, t-ratio of 1.89). However, when considering the individual results on a
15For robustness, we also consider a measure of net job creation that considers 1990 data. The results,
available upon request, are robust to the inclusion of that year. In any case, from 1992 onwards, the two
versions of net job creation coincide. On the other hand, hirings and separations rates ignore 1990: since
worker-level data is not available for that year, one cannot decompose the net job creation rate in 1990 in
terms of hirings and separations. For instance, hirings in 1991 correspond to all workers hired after March
1989 that are still employed in the rm by March 1991.
14year-by-year basis, the signicant estimate for the 1996-99 period seems to be driven almost
entirely by the 1997 result (coecient of 0.025, t-ratio of 2.6).
Moreover, when decomposing the job creation eects into its two worker 
ow components
- hirings and separations - we nd that most of the eect comes from the former. In fact, the
results indicate signicant increases in hirings, of between 0.008 and 0.01. (As the average
hiring rate in treated rms is 0.18 (see Table 1), this increase corresponds to approximately
5%.)
Overall, our conclusion from the results displayed in Table 3 is that there is evidence of
a slight increase in job creation in smaller rms brought about by a moderate increase in
hirings. Although these results are consistent with our theoretical predictions, there are some
issues that need to be taken into account when interpreting the ndings. One is that our
data are measured annually, a frequency that may not be suciently high to fully capture the
worker-
ow adjustments carried out by rms (Blanchard & Portugal 2001). Moreover, there
is no information on employment spells that start after March 1989 and end before March
1991 (i.e. after the last snapshot in the `before' period and before the rst snapshot in the
`after' period).
Another caveat is that changes in the levels of employment are aected by both voluntary
and involuntary separations - and perhaps an increase in the latter, as suggested by theory,
coincides with a decline of the former. This trade-o could arise if workers that before the
new law would have left voluntarily change their behaviour as they realise they can be more
easily red at the prospective new job. Moreover, as in Bauer et al. (2007), our study cannot
control directly for dierences across rms in their numbers of temporary workers. It could
be that smaller rms tend to employ a greater share of temporary workers and are thus less
aected by the reform.16 However, as we control carefully for the tenure level of each rms'
workforce, we believe this potential problem is not serious in our case.
In the next two subsections, we examine the impacts in terms of wages and rm perfor-
mance. As these two variables correspond to stocks, not 
ows, some of the issues described
above (e.g. the frequency of the data) are not relevant.
16Moreover, some evidence based on subjective, cross-section data suggests that medium-size rms are more
negatively aected by EPL than smaller rms (Pierre & Scarpetta 2006). Taking this result at face value, then
any increased levels of worker reallocation in smaller rms induced by the eight-paragraph dierence may have
been at least partly cancelled out by such greater sensitivity of larger rms with respect to EPL.
154.2 Wages
Table 4 and Figure 3 (straight line) presents our results, in which we take as the outcome
variable the logarithm of the rm-level real average hourly wage of all employees in each rm
and in each year. We nd signicant dierences between the treated and the control groups,
as wage growth rates in smaller rms are systematically and signicantly lower than in larger
rms. For instance, in the pooled results referring to 1991-99, the dierence in wage growth
is -0.028 (t-ratio of 5.1). Similar results are found when breaking up the entire 1990s in two
halves or individual years.
However, although wages fall signicantly, that would not necessarily imply dierences in
the reward policy of rms, following dierences in their relative bargaining power with respect
to employees, as discussed in Section 2.2. This would also be the case if, for instance, worker
composition changed. We assessed this alternative explanation by contrasting several dierent
worker characteristics (schooling, gender, job level, tenure, hours worked, etc), in terms of both
their means and standard deviations, across the treatment and control groups, over the 1991-
1999 period, employing the same methodology as for worker 
ows and wages. For none of those
worker characteristics did we nd any signicant dierences across the two groups of rms
(results available upon request). This result strengthens a bargaining interpretation of the
evidence, in which employers gain bargaining power when they are faced with less burdensome
ring procedures and are able to extract more surplus from their employees. However, the
results could also be consistent with constant bargaining parameters but a decrease in the
surplus generated by employer-employee matches due to any downturn in rm performance
caused by the new law. The next subsection examines this possibility by considering the
impact of the reform upon rm performance.17
4.3 Firm performance
In order to shed light on the contrasting theoretical views about the role of EPL on rm
performance discussed in Section 2.2, we examine dierent measures of rm performance that
can be constructed from our data (see the two bottom blocks of estimates in Table 4 and
17In current work (Martins 2008) we are extending the analysis of the impact on wages by considering possible
dierences across workers of dierent types, namely between those that are more or less likely to benet from
bargaining power (high- vs low-tenure workers, high- vs low-experience workers, men vs women), in the two
types of rms. Our preliminary results reinforce the view that bargaining power dierences are driving the
changes in wages observed here as the wages of workers that tend to have stronger bargaining power are also
those that grow more slowly as a consequence of the new law.
16Figure 3 - dashed line). In our rst measure, we consider the logarithm of total sales (2004
prices) per worker as the outcome variable. We nd that the pooled result for the entire 1991-
99 period is 0.05 (t-ratio of 2.4), indicating signicantly higher performance growth in treated
rms. Moreover, when decomposing this average eect over the decade, we nd evidence of
an increasing trend, suggesting that the performance eects are cumulative.
We also consider `surplus per worker' as an additional measure of performance. This is
dened as the dierence between total sales and the wage bill of each rm. The wage bill is
computed by summing all individual monthly wages, and multiplying that sum by 14 (the
number of months of pay due to each worker per year, according to Portuguese law) and by
1.2 (corresponding to employer payroll taxes of approximately 20%). We then take as our
dependent variable the logarithm of the ratio of that surplus by the number of workers. The
results (see the bottom of Table 4) are again consistent with the previous ndings, indicating
that treated rms underwent a positive relative increase in their performance. Furthermore,
the eects for this variable appear stronger than in the case of sales per worker. This is
not surprising as the dierence between the two variables - wages - is found to be negatively
aected by the reform (Section 4.2). Specically, the overall eect over the 1990s is now of
0.063 (t-ratio of 2.67). As in the case of sales per worker, the eects appear to be cumulative
over time.18
However, performance could be increasing in smaller rms because they were investing
more in capital or other inputs. We therefore search for evidence of capital deepening, by
considering a variable available in the data set (equity) that can be used as a proxy for the
amount of capital invested in the rm. Using the same framework as for the results described
above, we found no signicant dierences between treated and control group rms (results
available upon request). Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.2, we have also not found any
observable dierences in worker composition between treated and control group rms which,
of course, could also explain dierences in performance. Finally, it is worthwhile to take
into account that, if medium and large rms are the ones that tend to be most (negatively)
aected by EPL (Pierre & Scarpetta 2006), then our estimates of the impact of the reduction
in dismissal costs upon rm performance are lower bounds of the `average' eect of such costs
across the entire rm size distribution.
18We also consider a third measure of rm performance - sales (not divided by the size of the workforce).
As the results are qualitatively the same as for the two main variables, they are not presented here.
17Overall, the results support decisively the view that strict constraints against dismissals
for cause hurt rm performance. It is, however, less straightforward to decide if the increase
in performance is due to increased worker eort or to better personnel management (our two
theoretical explanations). Even the fact that all measures of performance indicate that the
eects increase over time, typically from about 5pp in the rst half of the 1990s to about 6pp
in the second half, suggesting that such benets arise gradually, can be reconciled with either
view. However, as these rm performance results reinforce the view that bargaining power
is transferred from employees to employers (as wages grow slower in a context of relative
performance gains) and we do not nd any signicant eects in terms of separations, it is
dicult to believe that such shift in bargaining power had no impact upon workers' eort.
5 Robustness
5.1 Dierence-in-dierences matching
As discussed before, complementing a dierence-in-dierences approach with matching may be
particularly insightful. We therefore start out robustness analysis with this method, matching
rms in terms of the very long set of variables considered in our results from Section 4.
Specically, the estimates presented here are based on Epanechnikov kernel matching, using
a bandwidth of 0.06, and the Leuven & Sianesi (2004) software. As mentioned before (and
in the Appendix), each estimate is obtained from the dierence between the value of the
dependent variable in a year in the `after' period and the value of the same variable for
the same treatment group rm in 1989. We then subtract from that dierence the average
dierence for the matched control group rms.
Table 5 presents the results concerning the balancing of covariates across the treatment
and control groups, before and after matching. We display the results for the main variables
measured in 1989 and some of their lags and squares, but not the values for the cubic terms
or for most dummy variables (full results available upon request). For almost all variables, we
observe a considerable reduction in the absolute value of bias after matching. Moreover, again
in almost all cases, one cannot reject the tests of equality of their average values between the
treated and the control groups, but only after matching. Furthermore, we have also found
from the pseudo-R2's of probit estimations of the propensity score on all the variables before
and after matching (Sianesi 2004) that the matched sample is considerably more homogeneous
18after the matching, as the pseudo-R2 falls from 0.068 to 0.017.
On the other hand, we nd that the imposition of the common support is not too restric-
tive, as only 6 rms are left out from the analysis as a consequence of that constraint. The
distributions of the propensity scores across the control and treatment groups are also reason-
ably similar, although we nd the expected greater density of control observations at lower
levels of the propensity score when compared to treatment observations. Overall, our view is
that there is strong evidence that the matching is of particularly good standards. However, the
reduction of bias achieved when balancing covariates suggests there is scope for dierences
in our ndings in this section with respect to the results from the dierence-in-dierences
analysis without matching.
Table 6 presents annual results concerning the eects of the law reform upon net job
creation, hirings and separations rates. Unlike in the case when we did not match, here we
nd no signicant dierences between the treatment and control groups in any of the three
dependent variables examined. This is particularly true in the case of hirings, which drove
most of the signicant ndings in the analysis without matching (Table 5). In the present
case, the t-ratios of the hirings variable never exceed 1.3 and in some years are even negative.
However, when considering wages and rm performance - see Table 7 -, we nd that the
signicantly negative or positive results for those two variables found before still hold when
matching. In the case of wages, their growth rates vary between 1.7pp and 3.9pp. In the case
of rm performance, sales per worker increase by between about 3pp and 11pp. Both ranges
of eects are very similar with respect to the results without matching and the same applies
to the precision of the estimates.
5.2 Articial threshold
Our second type of robustness analysis involves considering an `articial' rm size threshold
above the one determined by the law (20 employees). The concern this strategy seeks to
address is that the ndings reported above in Sections 4 and 5.1 may be driven by intrinsic
dierences between rms of dierent sizes and not related to any real impact of the law. For
instance, although most research focuses on the strong positive relationship between rm size
and wage levels (see Oi & Idson (1999) for a survey), it is possible that wage growth is also
generally higher at bigger rms. Such possibility could explain our ndings about wages, as
19they are based on contrasting wage growth over time between two groups of rms of dierent
sizes. Perhaps similar explanations could also be argued for the case of rm performance.
We implement our falsication exercise by creating a new data set, including now only
rms that employ, in the period 1987-1989, either between 20-29 workers (the new `treatment'
group) or 31-40 workers (the new `control' group), i.e. assuming that the size threshold indi-
cated by the law was 30. As before, we consider estimates from both dierence-in-dierences
and dierence-in-dierences matching.
In the dierence-in-dierences results based on this new dataset - Tables 8 and 9 -, we
nd that there are no signicant dierences in the net job creation rate when considering
either dierent groups of years or only individual years. However, the results for hirings now
indicate negative estimates, although generally insignicant. Moreover, we nd evidence of a
relative decline in the separations rate, although only in the second part of the 1990s.
With the possible exception of the case of hirings, these results support our previous re-
sult from Section 5.1 that there are no signicant dierences induced by the law regarding job
and worker 
ows. When examining the eects in terms of wages (see Table 9), we still nd
signicant negative dierences between `small' and `large' rms. However, the decomposition
by years indicates that the dierence is signicant only in four or ve years whereas in our
benchmark results all yearly estimates are negative. Moreover, we do not nd any signicant
dierences in terms of our measures of rm performance. On top of that, most rm perfor-
mance coecients are now negative in both measures considered. This latter result about rm
performance contrasts dramatically with the ndings based on the threshold established in
the law (20 employees), from which we documented signicant increases in rm performance.
In order to shed additional light on this question, and given the previous evidence of
dierences in the distributions of covariates in the unmatched sample (Sections 4 and 5.1),
we conduct a similar falsication analysis but now complemented with matching. In other
words, we again assume the false 30-employee threshold but now obtain our estimates from
a dierence-in-dierences matching analysis. We report the results for job and worker 
ows
in Table 10 and the results for wages and rm performance in Table 11. Here we nd that
almost none of the estimates for job or worker 
ows is signicant at conventional levels. (The
single exception, hirings in 1996, turns out to be a negative estimate.)19 Moreover, in the
19We also nd, as before, evidence of considerable dierences in the distributions of covariates in the un-
matched sample. In this case, the pseudo-R
2's of probit estimations of the propensity score on all the variables
20case of wages, only three out of nine estimates have t-ratios above 1.8. Finally, in the case
of rm performance, all estimates are either insignicant or, if signicant, negative, again in
both measures considered.20
The comparison of Figure 4, where we present the main results of this analysis based on
articial threshold, over the entire decade, with Figure 3, which is based on a dierence-in-
dierences analysis considering the threshold indicated in the law, is striking. In Figure 4,
not only are the condence intervals much wider, as the point estimates for each one of the
three variables depicted tends to vary from positive to negative values.
Overall, we interpret the results from this analysis based on `articial' thresholds as evi-
dence that our main results are not picking up eects that emanate from dierences in rm size
and that happen to coincide with the thresholds dened by the new law. In other words, we
regard these `falsication' results as important evidence in favour of the causal interpretation
of our main ndings.
5.3 Wider range of rms
As argued in Section 3, we are concerned that a `regression to the mean' eect could bias any
results based on assigning rms into the treatment or control groups solely in terms of rm
size in a single year (the last year of the `before' period, for instance). We therefore adopted
an assignment procedure in our benchmark approach that considers rms' size over the last
three years of the `before' period and requires such size to be in the same category (10-19 or
21-30) over that period. In this subsection, we consider the robustness of our ndings to a
looser assignment procedure, based only on rm size in 1989.
Tables 12 and 13 present the results (see also Figure 5). We nd that the number of rms
under analysis more than doubles in the case of the control group and increases by more than
50% in the case of the treatment group. Moreover, we also obtain evidence of the `regression
to the mean' process mentioned above as, unlike in the case of the benchmark sample, we
now obtain evidence of signicantly higher net job creation rates within the treated group.
Four out of the nine point estimates are signicant at conventional levels, ranging between
before and after matching (Sianesi 2004) falls from 0.049 (p-value of 0.001) to 0.003 (p-value of 1). This result
is further evidence of the usefulness of combining a dierence-in-dierences approach with matching.
20Such signicantly negative results in the case of rm performance may actually be considered as evidence
in favour of our main ndings, as they may indicate that, although the performance of larger rms tends to
grow faster than that of smaller rms, that pattern is reversed in the specic case of rms that benet from
lower ring costs.
21about 2 and 3pp (top section of Table 12). When decomposing this eect in terms of hirings
and separations, we nd that each component is important, as the former increase while the
latter fall, although fewer estimates are signicant.
Moreover, we nd, as before, that wages grow more slowly in rms below the 20-employee
threshold, even when not requiring greater stability in terms of rm size over the `before' pe-
riod. Similarly, all point estimates regarding the eects of the new law upon rm performance
remain positive, although in this case several estimates are not signicant at conventional lev-
els. As mentioned above, we explain the drop in signicance of these estimates to the looser
assignment of rms to either the control or treatment groups. In any case, we regard these
results as supporting our main ndings and also the option to obtain the benchmark results
from a tighter sample of rms.
We conduct an additional robustness analysis related to the issue of size requirements for
assignment to the treatment or control groups. As the treatment group is assumed to have
the same absolute size as the control group (21 to 30 workers or 10 to 19 workers), we may
be ruling out by denition high percentage changes in the variables of interest (in particular,
net job creation). Such restriction may then have aected our main results.
Moreover, there is also an additional related point, discussed earlier in the paper, con-
cerning the heterogeneity of the eects of the new law depending on the type of rm and its
distance, in terms of rm size, to the threshold set by the new law. For instance, large rms
`considerably' away from the threshold may be less likely to engage in worker dismissals in
order to benet from the lower ring costs once they eventually cross the size threshold. To
that extent, if one were to widen the range of the control group, then the results concerning
job and worker 
ows eects may turn out to be stronger than for the current rm-size range.
On the other hand, widening either the control or treatment groups may lead to bias or less
precision in the estimates, to the extent that such new groups become more heterogeneous in
other aspects that are not controlled for in the analysis.
Bearing in mind the trade-o described above, we investigate the robustness of our results
to the consideration of a wider range of control-group rm sizes. Specically, we follow the
same approach based on a dierence-in-dierences matching analysis of rms that are in the
same size category over the 1987-1989 period. However, we now extend the control group to
include rms sized 21 to 40 up to 1989. The results, presented in Tables 14 and 15, are again
22supportive of our main ndings, namely in terms of wages and rm performance. However,
as predicted above, we nd evidence of moderate increases in net job creation, mostly due to
increases in hirings. On the other hand, we nd strong evidence of slower wage growth and
higher performance growth in smaller rms. In the former case, point estimates range between
2pp and 3pp and are always precisely estimated. In the case of rm performance, the estimates
are more dispersed and less precise - which is consistent with the greater heterogeneity of the
control group - but are still very much consistent with the evidence from our benchmark
ndings.
5.4 Other tests
In this last subsection, we describe summarily the remaining robustness analysis conducted.
These results are not reported but are available by request. In our rst approach, we reesti-
mate the benchmark rm-level results (dierence-in-dierences propensity score matching of
`permanent' rms) but considering now only continuing rms from 1987 to 1999. Previously,
we had considered all rms present in the data from 1987 to 1989 and then in each year from
1991 to 1999 in which those rms are present in the data. The present robustness analysis
seeks to consider the possibility that composition dierences over time (namely as rms leave
business or are acquired) drive, at least partially, our results. For instance, perhaps the rela-
tive increases in performance that we nd for smaller rms are driven by the disappearance
from the sample of rms that perform poorly (possibly because they become bankrupt), con-
sequently being ignored in the results. By considering now only rms that are always present
in our data set, we rule out such censoring bias.
We nd that the number of rms declines from between about 5000 in 1990 and about 4000
in 1999, when considering all rm-years, to about 1700, when only considering rms present
in all years, from 1987 to 1999. This indicates that the sample of rms used in each year in
previous analysis can vary reasonably. However, more importantly, our results based only on
continuing rms indicate that our benchmark ndings are robust in this respect. There are
no qualitative dierences in terms of job or worker 
ows when compared to the benchmark
results of Tables 6 and 7. Moreover, wages also decrease signicantly and rm performance
also undergoes a signicant increase, at very similar magnitudes, although in the latter case
the precision of the estimates falls. While the decrease in precision may in part indicate that
23rm selection matters, the smaller sample size will also play some role in the result. In any
case, it is important to underline that the qualitative results are unchanged and that several
point estimates remain statistically signicant.
In our second robustness test in this subsection, we reestimate the main rm-level results
but using a dierent matching algorithm. Instead of kernel matching, we now consider nearest
neighbour matching (ve nearest matches or one nearest match). The results are again very
similar to those obtained in the main estimates, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms.
As before, we nd insignicant dierences in 
ows, a signicant decrease in wages and a
signicant increase in dierent proxies of rm performance. Similar results are again obtained
if we extend the set of matching variables to include measures of the dispersion of worker-level
characteristics within rms (tenure, experience and schooling) or match on median worker-
level characteristics rather than mean worker-level variables.
Our third analysis involves the possibility that by March 1989 (the reference period in
our data) some rms were already responding to the reform, implying that 1989 cannot be
considered as the last year of the `before' period. As explained in Section 2.1, we do not
believe this to be the case, as there was still great uncertainty at the time concerning the
specic content of the employment law, not to mention if the reform would go ahead at all.
In any case, in order to examine this possibility, we consider 1988 as the last year of the
`before' period and keep 1990 and 1991 as the rst years of the `after' period. Again we
obtain the same qualitative results as in the benchmark case, although the results about rm
performance tend to be slightly less signicant in some years.
Finally, we also replicate our main analysis but trimming the range of rm sizes covered.
When considering only rms employing between 15 and 19 workers in 1987-1989 and rms
employing between 21 and 25 workers in the same period, we nd again the same qualitative
results. However, as the sample size becomes considerably smaller (less than 700 treated rms
and less than 400 control rms) and, in relative terms, the scope for misclassication increases
(e.g. rms employing 19 workers in March 1989 may be employing 21 workers in June), the
estimates tend to be somewhat less signicant than in the benchmark results. Moreover, the
heterogeneity of threshold eects will also be more important in this smaller sample.
246 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence about the eects of a specic component of employment pro-
tection legislation that has received relatively little attention but may be very important in
practice - the regulations involving dismissals for cause. Indeed, while the literature has so
far focused on constraints regarding dismissals driven by economic shocks, adjustment costs
imposed upon dismissals related to worker performance or disciplinary reasons may also be
particularly relevant.
In order to identify the impact of the regulations governing dismissals for cause, we study
a quasi-natural experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal in 1989 which cut ring
costs for all rms, but particularly for smaller rms. Until then, there was no dierentiation
in ring costs for rms of dierent size, unlike in other countries. In the new law, out of the
12 paragraphs that dictated the costly procedure that rms should follow when dismissing
a worker for cause, eight of those paragraphs did not apply to rms employing 20 or fewer
workers. Firing costs related to dismissals for cause thus became considerably lighter for those
smaller rms.
Using detailed matched employer-employee longitudinal data and dierence-in-dierences
methods, we examine the impact of this dierentiated change in ring costs upon a large
range of outcomes, measured over an extended period of time (1991-1999). In our results,
while theory predicts increased worker turnover, we do not nd robust evidence of signicant
eects in job or worker 
ows, although some results do indicate a slight increase in job creation
derived from higher hirings. On the other hand, we nd that smaller rms exhibit signicant
and stable slower wage growth (of about 2pp to 3pp). Smaller rms also exhibit signicant
and largely permanent increases in dierent measures of rm performance (typically increasing
from about 3pp to 10pp over the 1990s).
Moreover, we also provide evidence that these developments cannot be explained by any
signicant dierences in terms of observable worker composition or capital deepening. Im-
portantly, the results are also not driven by rm heterogeneity that coincides with the size
threshold dened in the law. The results are also robust to alternative sample denitions,
dierent matching algorithms, and several other robustness analysis.
Overall, our ndings suggest that worker eort responds to the severity of EPL constraints
of the type examined here. At the same time, the reduction in ring constraints is also likely
25to transfer bargaining power from employees to their employers, which can explain the slower
wage growth found in our results.
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29A Appendix - Identication
Let Y D
it be the potential outcome of interest for rm i at time t had they been in state Di,
where Di = 1 if exposed to the treatment (a rm employing less than 20 workers in the
`before' period) and 0 otherwise. Let treatment take place at time t (from May 1989, in our
case). The fundamental identication problem lies in the fact that we do not observe, at time
t, rm i in both states. Therefore, we cannot compute the treatment eect, Y 1
it   Y 0
it. One
can, however, if provided with a convenient control group, estimate the average eect of the
treatment on the treated.
One approach is a dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimator (see Meyer (1995)), in which
one uses an untreated comparison group to identify temporal variation in the outcome that
is not due to the treatment. However, in order to achieve identication of the general DID
estimator we need to assume that the average outcomes for treated and controls would have
followed parallel paths over time if there had been no treatment. This is known as the time-
invariance assumption:
E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j Di = 1] = E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j Di = 0]; (2)
where t0 is a time period before the program implementation. The assumption states that,
over time, the outcome variable of treated individuals (Di = 1), in the event that they had not
been exposed to the treatment, would have evolved in the same fashion as actually observed
for the individuals not exposed to the treatment (Di = 0).
If assumption (2) holds, the DID estimate of the average treatment eect on the treated
can be obtained by the sample analogs of
b DID = fE[Yit jDi = 1]   E[Yit jDi = 0]g   fE[Yit0 jDi = 1]   E[Yit0 jDi = 0]g: (3)
The expression above states that the impact of the program is given by the dierence
between participants and nonparticipants in the before-after dierence in outcomes.
A problem with this approach is that the time-invariance assumption can be too stringent if
the treated and control groups are not balanced in covariates that are believed to be associated
with the outcome variable. In this case, the DID setup can be extended to accommodate a set
of covariates, something which is usually done linearly, taking into account eligibility specic
eects and time or aggregate eects. In the following model, based on a sample of treatment
and control units:
Yit = Di + t + 0Zit + DiDit + "it; (4)
where Di is as before and represents the eligibility-specic intercept, t captures time or
aggregate eects, and Z is a vector of covariates included to correct for dierences in observed
characteristics between individuals in treatment and control groups, b Di would correspond to
the DID estimate. This estimator controls for both dierences in the Zs and for time-specic
eects, but it does not impose common support on the distribution of the Z0s across the cells
dened by the DID approach.
In order to address this possible shortcoming of the standard DID method, we comple-
ment it with a matching framework (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983), resulting in a dierence-in-
dierences matching (DDM) estimator (Heckman et al. 1997, 1998). DDM has been compared
with other methods by Smith & Todd (2005) and has been shown to have the potential ben-
et of eliminating some sources of bias present in non-experimental settings, improving the
quality of evaluation results signicantly. Moreover, DDM is particularly appropriate for our
analysis as we can draw upon a rich set of covariates, all data are compiled by the same agency
and we can also use data for comparison groups from the same local labor market (Heckman
et al. 1997). In general, the feasibility of the matching strategy relies on a rich set of observ-
30able individual characteristics, X, so that the distribution of the individual characteristics
important to the evaluation exercise is the same in the dierence-in-dierences cells.
The matching process then models the probability of participation and matches individ-
uals with similar propensity scores. Moreover, the time invariance assumption for the DDM
estimator is now
E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j p;Di = 1] = E[Y 0
it   Y 0
it0 j p;Di = 0]; (5)
where p = Pr(D = 1jX) is the propensity score. When estimating the mean impact of the


















and also requires that there is a nonparticipant analogue for each participant, implying that
Pr(D = 1jX) < 1.
The DDM estimator takes two forms, depending on the nature of the data, namely re-
peated cross-sections and panel data. In the latter case, the one employed in this paper, the
estimator involves rst calculating the dierences over time in the dependent variable for each
observation and then matching treatment and control units using propensity score estimates
based on `before'-period characteristics. Formally,
b DDM = E
h
(Y 1
t   Y 1
t0)   b E
 
Y 0




where b E (Y jP) represents the expected outcome of individuals in the control group matched
with those in the treatment group.
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10−19 21−30 10−19 21−30 10−19 21−30
10−19 in t+2 21−30 in t+2
Note: Samples are all rms present in years t and t+2 (t = 1987;1989 or 1991). Height of the bars indicate percentage
of rms in either 10-19 or 21-30 size categories in t + 2 that are of the size indicated on the x-axis in year t. Bars do
not sum to one because other rm sizes besides 10-19 and 21-30 are omitted.












10−19 21−30 10−19 21−30 10−19 21−30
10−19 in t+2 21−30 in t+2
Note: Samples are rms present in the same size category over period 1987-1989. Height of the bars indicate
percentage of rms in either 10-19 or 21-30 size categories in t + 2 that are of the size indicated on the x-axis in year t.
Bars do not sum to one because other rm sizes besides 10-19 and 21-30 are omitted.



























Note: Each point refers to a given variable in a given year and corresponds to an estimate from a separate
dierence-in-dierences regression. Condence intervals of 1:6 standard errors around each estimate. Robust
standard errors allowing for clustering at the rm level. `Permanent rms' indicates that the assignment to the control
or treatment groups requires that rms remain in the same size category from 1987 to 1989. `Net job creation' is
measured as a rate, `Wages' correspond to the log of the real hourly wage, and `Firm performance' correspond to the
log of real total sales divided by the number of employees.
34Figure 4: Articial threshold - `Eects' on Net Job Creation, Wages and Firm Performance


























Note: `Articial threshold' means that, unlike indicated by the law reform, rms sized 21-30 are assigned to the
treatment group and rms sized 31-40 are assigned to the control group. Each point refers to a given variable in a
given year and corresponds to an estimate from a separate dierence-in-dierences matching estimation. Condence
intervals of 1:6 standard errors around each estimate. `Permanent rms' indicates that the assignment to the control
or treatment groups requires that rms remain in the same size category from 1987 to 1989. `Net job creation' is
measured as a rate, `Wages' correspond to the log of the real hourly wage, and `Firm performance' correspond to the
log of real total sales divided by the number of employees.



























Note: Each point refers to a given variable in a given year and corresponds to an estimate from a separate
dierence-in-dierences matching estimation. Condence intervals of 1:6 standard errors around each estimate. `All
rms' indicates that the assignment to the control or treatment groups is based only on rm size in 1989. `Net job
creation' is measured as a rate, `Wages' correspond to the log of the real hourly wage, and `Firm performance'
correspond to the log of real total sales divided by the number of employees.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, rm characteristics in 1989
Treatment group Control group
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Firm size 13.86 2.62 5863 25.25 2.65 1617
Sales per worker 101.52 533.84 4815 104.75 286.42 1354
Foreign rm 0.01 0.10 5863 0.01 0.11 1617
Year rm started 1970.00 20.72 4587 1966.12 27.96 1338
Net job creation rate -0.01 -0.15 5599 0.00 0.10 1566
Hiring rate 0.18 0.16 5599 0.16 0.13 1566
Separation rate 0.19 0.16 5599 0.16 0.12 1566
Job reallocation rate 0.11 0.10 5599 0.07 0.06 1566
Worker reallocation rate 0.37 0.29 5599 0.33 0.23 1566
Churning rate 0.26 0.27 5599 0.25 0.23 1566
Schooling 5.62 1.86 5805 5.65 1.80 1595
Experience 23.59 7.19 5787 24.12 6.52 1594
Tenure 7.04 4.59 5821 7.99 4.52 1613
Female 0.35 0.31 5863 0.36 0.31 1617
Job level 5.72 0.73 5763 5.64 0.64 1602
Hourly pay 2.72 1.45 5732 2.96 1.53 1596
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. Treatment and Control refers to
rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19 employees in 1989 are in the
treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in 1989 are in the control group). See main text for the
formal denition of each variable.
37Table 2: Number of rms and workers, 1986-1999
Firms Workers
Year Treated Control Total Treated Control Total
1986 5,349 1,543 6,892 69,491 37,077 106,568
1987 5,863 1,617 7,480 79,199 40,202 119,401
1988 5,863 1,617 7,480 80,829 40,732 121,561
1989 5,863 1,617 7,480 81,238 40,824 122,062
1990 5,430 1,522 6,952
1991 5,136 1,463 6,599 72,848 37,257 110,105
1992 5,006 1,422 6,428 71,053 36,315 107,368
1993 4,768 1,380 6,148 66,678 34,074 100,752
1994 4,475 1,301 5,776 61,429 31,057 92,486
1995 4,286 1,244 5,530 59,008 29,434 88,442
1996 4,084 1,174 5,258 55,675 27,826 83,501
1997 3,999 1,163 5,162 55,343 27,324 82,667
1998 3,825 1,110 4,935 53,716 26,342 80,058
1999 3,779 1,087 4,866 53,726 25,591 79,317
Total 67,726 19,260 86,986 860,233 434,055 1,294,288
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. Treatment
and Control refers to rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms
with 10 to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30
employees in 1989 are in the control group).
38Table 3: Eects on job and worker 
ows (Dierences in Dier-
ences, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year Coe. t Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991-99 0.007 1.57 28717 8841
1991-95 0.004 0.79 13520 4190
1996-99 0.011 1.89 15197 4651
1991 0.004 0.44 3502 1091
1992 -0.006 -0.80 3327 1039
1993 0.016 1.88 3337 1028
1994 0.005 0.42 3354 1032
1995 0.008 0.85 3254 1023
1996 0.009 0.93 3133 951
1997 0.025 2.60 3048 929
1998 -0.007 -0.74 2899 881
1999 0.016 1.56 2863 867
Hirings rate
1991-99 0.009 2.17 28717 8841
1991-95 0.008 1.96 13520 4190
1996-99 0.010 1.97 15197 4651
1991 0.006 1.01 3502 1091
1992 0.003 0.57 3327 1039
1993 0.010 1.92 3337 1028
1994 0.014 2.48 3354 1032
1995 0.010 1.58 3254 1023
1996 0.012 1.80 3133 951
1997 0.015 1.93 3048 929
1998 -0.000 -0.01 2899 881
1999 0.011 1.62 2863 867
Separations rate
1991-99 0.001 0.26 28717 8841
1991-95 0.003 0.67 13520 4190
1996-99 -0.001 -0.13 15197 4651
1991 0.002 0.24 3502 1091
1992 0.009 1.35 3327 1039
1993 -0.007 -0.83 3337 1028
1994 0.010 0.98 3354 1032
1995 0.002 0.19 3254 1023
1996 0.003 0.33 3133 951
1997 -0.010 -1.01 3048 929
1998 0.007 0.77 2899 881
1999 -0.005 -0.51 2863 867
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. Coe refers to
the coecient of the treatment dummy in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t denotes the t-ratio, based on robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering by rm. The outcome variable is measured by the
dierence between the value of the variable in the year under analysis and the base
year, 1989. See main text for the formal denition of each variable. N. Obs indicates
the number of rms in the treatment and control groups.
39Table 4: Eects on wages and rm performance (Dierences
in Dierences, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year Coe t Treated Control
Wages
1991-99 -0.028 -5.11 33037 9901
1991-95 -0.025 -4.56 15644 4701
1996-99 -0.031 -4.52 17393 5200
1991 -0.021 -3.10 3915 1183
1992 -0.027 -3.37 3940 1170
1993 -0.029 -3.43 3885 1170
1994 -0.025 -2.96 3904 1178
1995 -0.018 -2.18 3734 1124
1996 -0.036 -3.86 3558 1054
1997 -0.041 -4.32 3494 1052
1998 -0.036 -4.04 3322 995
1999 -0.027 -3.01 3285 975
Sales per worker
1991-99 0.050 2.41 26430 7840
1991-95 0.044 2.18 12853 3821
1996-99 0.056 2.26 13577 4019
1991 0.033 1.43 3281 967
1992 0.044 1.92 3265 964
1993 0.079 2.99 3221 962
1994 0.016 0.60 3086 928
1995 0.036 1.30 2898 854
1996 0.045 1.60 2783 820
1997 0.035 1.12 2677 793
1998 0.101 3.18 2629 774
1999 0.076 2.51 2590 778
Surplus per worker
1991-99 0.063 2.67 25453 7563
1991-95 0.055 2.38 12356 3689
1996-99 0.070 2.39 13097 3874
1991 0.035 1.23 3173 938
1992 0.066 2.33 3146 941
1993 0.084 2.72 3077 916
1994 0.031 0.91 2960 894
1995 0.055 1.47 2800 829
1996 0.043 1.17 2671 787
1997 0.044 1.20 2584 763
1998 0.117 3.10 2538 741
1999 0.102 2.71 2504 754
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables con-
sidered and at the year under analysis. t denotes the t-ratio, based on robust
standard errors, allowing for clustering by rm. The outcome variable is mea-
sured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under analysis
and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms
in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19 employees
in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in 1989 are in
the control group).
40Table 5: Analysis of balancing properties
Mean % reduct t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias bias t p > [t]
Schooling Unmatched 5.607 5.6191 -0.7 -0.21 0.834
Matched 5.6037 5.61 -0.4 47.6 -0.16 0.872
Experience Unmatched 23.475 24.152 -10 -3.02 0.003
Matched 23.479 23.663 -2.7 72.8 -1.19 0.233
Tenure Unmatched 7.1285 8.1585 -22.7 -7.01 0
Matched 7.1356 7.2081 -1.6 93 -0.73 0.467
Female Unmatched 0.33483 0.3384 -1.2 -0.37 0.709
Matched 0.33491 0.3338 0.4 68.9 0.17 0.864
Hourly Pay Unmatched 2.7174 2.9382 -15.9 -4.99 0
Matched 2.714 2.7783 -4.6 70.8 -2.13 0.033
Hours Unmatched 169.38 168.92 1.9 0.59 0.554
Matched 169.39 168.93 1.9 -0.3 0.86 0.391
Job Level Unmatched 5.7263 5.6525 11.1 3.28 0.001
Matched 5.7284 5.706 3.4 69.7 1.46 0.145
Foreign Unmatched 0.00964 0.01208 -2.3 -0.75 0.454
Matched 0.00966 0.00907 0.6 75.8 0.28 0.781
Year Birth Unmatched 1970.6 1966.3 20 6.9 0
Matched 1970.6 1970.2 2 89.9 1.19 0.234
Lag Schooling Unmatched 5.5717 5.5482 1.3 0.39 0.693
Matched 5.5681 5.5699 -0.1 92.4 -0.04 0.965
Lag Experience Unmatched 23.268 23.95 -10.2 -3.09 0.002
Matched 23.271 23.452 -2.7 73.4 -1.2 0.23
Lag Tenure Unmatched 6.9071 7.9483 -23 -7.09 0
Matched 6.9135 6.964 -1.1 95.2 -0.51 0.612
Lag Female Unmatched 0.32984 0.3313 -0.5 -0.15 0.879
Matched 0.3298 0.32709 0.9 -85.8 0.42 0.677
Lag Hourly Pay Unmatched 2.6271 2.8769 -17.6 -5.87 0
Matched 2.624 2.6888 -4.6 74.1 -2.29 0.022
Lag Hours Unmatched 171.29 170.98 1.3 0.4 0.691
Matched 171.31 170.58 3 -134.5 1.35 0.176
Lag Job Level Unmatched 5.7404 5.6592 11.8 3.5 0
Matched 5.7426 5.7231 2.8 76 1.25 0.211
Schooling
2 Unmatched 3.4681 3.4577 0.4 0.13 0.899
Matched 3.4618 3.4664 -0.2 56.1 -0.08 0.935
Experience
2 Unmatched 60.113 62.478 -6.8 -2.06 0.039
Matched 60.117 60.858 -2.1 68.7 -0.94 0.349
Tenure
2 Unmatched 7.1589 8.6803 -16.5 -5.12 0
Matched 7.168 7.2183 -0.5 96.7 -0.25 0.801
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. Treatment and Control
indicates the number of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10
to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in 1989
are in the control group). All variables are rm-level averages based on the characteristics of
rms in 1989 (lags correspond to 1988 information).
41Table 6: Robustness - Eects on job and worker 
ows
(Dierences-in-Dierences Matching, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991 -0.005 -0.44 3480 1091
1992 -0.012 -1.41 3309 1039
1993 0.016 1.62 3319 1028
1994 0.004 0.34 3335 1032
1995 0.009 0.84 3234 1023
1996 0.009 0.78 3114 951
1997 0.025 2.34 3030 929
1998 -0.012 -1.20 2882 881
1999 0.018 1.58 2846 867
Hirings rate
1991 -0.001 -0.19 3480 1091
1992 -0.001 -0.11 3309 1039
1993 0.002 0.28 3319 1028
1994 0.007 1.05 3335 1032
1995 0.006 0.89 3234 1023
1996 0.008 1.11 3114 951
1997 0.005 0.61 3030 929
1998 -0.002 -0.27 2882 881
1999 0.010 1.29 2846 867
Separations rate
1991 0.003 0.39 3480 1091
1992 0.011 1.51 3309 1039
1993 -0.014 -1.56 3319 1028
1994 0.003 0.26 3335 1032
1995 -0.003 -0.26 3234 1023
1996 -0.000 -0.02 3114 951
1997 -0.020 -1.79 3030 929
1998 0.010 1.00 2882 881
1999 -0.007 -0.70 2846 867
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to
the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome variable
is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under
analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number
of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19
employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in
1989 are in the control group).
42Table 7: Robustness - Eects on wages and rm performance
(Dierences-in-Dierences Matching, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Wages
1991 -0.018 -2.18 3892 1183
1992 -0.025 -2.56 3919 1170
1993 -0.028 -2.75 3864 1170
1994 -0.019 -1.87 3882 1178
1995 -0.017 -1.66 3715 1124
1996 -0.032 -2.75 3539 1054
1997 -0.039 -3.24 3474 1052
1998 -0.038 -3.32 3306 995
1999 -0.018 -1.61 3269 975
Sales per worker
1991 0.041 1.59 3274 967
1992 0.046 1.76 3258 964
1993 0.074 2.51 3213 962
1994 0.028 0.92 3079 928
1995 0.058 1.84 2890 854
1996 0.049 1.55 2775 820
1997 0.031 0.89 2672 793
1998 0.109 2.98 2624 774
1999 0.073 2.18 2582 778
Surplus per worker
1991 0.057 1.79 3167 938
1992 0.075 2.33 3141 941
1993 0.075 2.21 3071 916
1994 0.046 1.18 2957 894
1995 0.073 1.74 2794 829
1996 0.054 1.29 2665 787
1997 0.046 1.09 2580 763
1998 0.158 3.71 2534 741
1999 0.110 2.56 2499 754
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables consid-
ered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome
variable is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the
year under analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the
number of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10
to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees
in 1989 are in the control group).
43Table 8: Robustness - Eects on job and worker 
ows - Arti-
cial threshold (20-40 employees in 1989, Dierences-in-Dierences,
`Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year Coe t Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991-99 0.010 1.46 9394 3862
1991-95 0.010 1.24 4444 1811
1996-99 0.009 1.18 4950 2051
1991 0.008 0.53 1151 474
1992 0.023 1.98 1110 443
1993 -0.004 -0.35 1085 438
1994 0.017 0.92 1098 456
1995 0.011 0.77 1086 446
1996 0.017 1.04 1015 411
1997 -0.017 -1.14 992 404
1998 0.019 1.36 938 400
1999 0.017 1.04 919 390
Hirings rate
1991-99 -0.007 -1.34 9394 3862
1991-95 -0.001 -0.14 4444 1811
1996-99 -0.013 -1.85 4950 2051
1991 0.008 0.97 1151 474
1992 0.003 0.39 1110 443
1993 -0.009 -1.30 1085 438
1994 -0.004 -0.53 1098 456
1995 -0.009 -1.13 1086 446
1996 -0.021 -2.02 1015 411
1997 -0.016 -1.35 992 404
1998 -0.011 -1.07 938 400
1999 -0.008 -0.92 919 390
Separations rate
1991-99 -0.017 -2.51 9394 3862
1991-95 -0.011 -1.50 4444 1811
1996-99 -0.023 -2.60 4950 2051
1991 0.000 0.01 1151 474
1992 -0.020 -1.97 1110 443
1993 -0.005 -0.44 1085 438
1994 -0.021 -1.28 1098 456
1995 -0.020 -1.50 1086 446
1996 -0.038 -2.67 1015 411
1997 0.002 0.10 992 404
1998 -0.030 -2.13 938 400
1999 -0.025 -1.54 919 390
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to
the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t denotes the t-ratio, based on robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering by rm. The outcome variable is measured by the
dierence between the value of the variable in the year under analysis and the base
year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms in the treatment
and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19 employees in 1989 are in the
treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in 1989 are in the control group).
44Table 9: Robustness - Eects on wages and rm performance
- Articial threshold (20-40 employees in 1989, Dierences-in-
Dierences, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year Coe t Treated Control
Wages
1991-99 -0.027 -3.43 10501 4216
1991-95 -0.024 -3.10 4985 1972
1996-99 -0.027 -2.81 5516 2244
1991 -0.011 -1.13 1255 496
1992 -0.012 -1.18 1240 491
1993 -0.028 -2.29 1235 484
1994 -0.047 -3.42 1255 501
1995 -0.026 -2.27 1189 481
1996 -0.022 -1.59 1125 451
1997 -0.023 -1.71 1115 452
1998 -0.030 -2.31 1054 436
1999 -0.036 -2.75 1033 424
Sales per worker
1991-99 -0.040 -1.35 8369 3465
1991-95 -0.030 -1.05 4072 1659
1996-99 -0.049 -1.37 4297 1806
1991 0.007 0.21 1032 418
1992 -0.004 -0.11 1024 417
1993 -0.103 -2.65 1024 417
1994 -0.024 -0.55 992 407
1995 -0.016 -0.40 917 379
1996 -0.044 -1.06 879 368
1997 -0.011 -0.24 849 362
1998 -0.076 -1.57 827 345
1999 -0.098 -2.16 825 352
Surplus per worker
1991-99 -0.047 -1.39 8076 3348
1991-95 -0.030 -0.91 3931 1606
1996-99 -0.063 -1.49 4145 1742
1991 0.048 1.28 1003 412
1992 -0.007 -0.15 999 406
1993 -0.120 -2.75 976 398
1994 -0.049 -0.95 953 390
1995 -0.046 -0.88 890 364
1996 -0.030 -0.54 847 357
1997 -0.015 -0.27 815 345
1998 -0.088 -1.50 794 334
1999 -0.129 -2.40 799 342
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables con-
sidered and at the year under analysis. t denotes the t-ratio, based on robust
standard errors, allowing for clustering by rm. The outcome variable is mea-
sured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under analysis
and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number of rms
in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19 employees
in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in 1989 are in
the control group).
45Table 10: Robustness - Eects on job and worker 
ows - Arti-
cial threshold (20-40 employees in 1989, Dierences-in-Dierences
Matching, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991 0.016 0.76 1155 477
1992 0.013 0.80 1103 448
1993 -0.002 -0.12 1092 441
1994 0.029 1.20 1106 460
1995 0.016 0.88 1094 452
1996 -0.013 -0.63 1027 417
1997 -0.026 -1.40 990 409
1998 0.014 0.71 945 403
1999 0.013 0.62 928 393
Hirings rate
1991 0.012 1.01 1155 477
1992 0.001 0.10 1103 448
1993 -0.012 -1.13 1092 441
1994 0.001 0.09 1106 460
1995 -0.007 -0.61 1094 452
1996 -0.030 -1.98 1027 417
1997 -0.019 -1.10 990 409
1998 -0.007 -0.50 945 403
1999 -0.006 -0.52 928 393
Separations rate
1991 -0.004 -0.25 1155 477
1992 -0.012 -0.86 1103 448
1993 -0.010 -0.59 1092 441
1994 -0.028 -1.32 1106 460
1995 -0.023 -1.27 1094 452
1996 -0.016 -0.90 1027 417
1997 0.007 0.38 990 409
1998 -0.021 -1.05 945 403
1999 -0.020 -0.92 928 393
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to
the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome variable
is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under
analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number
of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19
employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in
1989 are in the control group).
46Table 11: Robustness - Eects on wages and rm per-
formance - Articial threshold (20-40 employees in 1989,
Dierences-in-Dierences Matching, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Wages
1991 -0.008 -0.49 1259 500
1992 -0.016 -1.01 1246 496
1993 -0.050 -2.71 1241 489
1994 -0.061 -2.88 1262 507
1995 -0.032 -1.81 1196 487
1996 -0.020 -0.98 1137 457
1997 -0.022 -1.09 1120 457
1998 -0.017 -0.85 1062 439
1999 -0.034 -1.58 1039 429
Sales per worker
1991 0.012 0.29 1034 419
1992 -0.007 -0.14 1025 419
1993 -0.103 -1.99 1026 419
1994 0.068 1.16 994 409
1995 0.013 0.24 923 381
1996 0.024 0.41 887 370
1997 0.059 0.93 855 363
1998 -0.044 -0.66 828 345
1999 -0.083 -1.36 823 353
Surplus per worker
1991 0.044 0.90 1005 413
1992 0.009 0.17 1000 408
1993 -0.147 -2.54 978 400
1994 -0.002 -0.02 956 392
1995 0.029 0.44 895 366
1996 0.088 1.13 855 359
1997 0.011 0.14 820 346
1998 -0.066 -0.83 792 334
1999 -0.106 -1.51 798 343
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables consid-
ered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome
variable is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the
year under analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the
number of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10
to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees
in 1989 are in the control group).
47Table 12: Robustness - Eects on job and worker 
ows - `All'
rms (Dierences-in-Dierences Matching)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991 -0.009 -0.97 5849 2328
1992 -0.000 -0.01 5577 2259
1993 0.012 1.40 5578 2274
1994 0.016 1.51 5590 2243
1995 0.026 2.75 5459 2186
1996 0.019 1.96 5177 2043
1997 0.031 3.18 5039 1982
1998 0.003 0.35 4818 1885
1999 0.027 2.76 4732 1878
Hirings rate
1991 -0.005 -0.81 5849 2328
1992 0.007 1.10 5577 2259
1993 0.010 1.69 5578 2274
1994 0.011 1.68 5590 2243
1995 0.013 1.98 5459 2186
1996 0.007 1.09 5177 2043
1997 0.008 1.15 5039 1982
1998 0.001 0.19 4818 1885
1999 0.015 2.12 4732 1878
Separations rate
1991 0.004 0.66 5849 2328
1992 0.007 1.08 5577 2259
1993 -0.002 -0.36 5578 2274
1994 -0.005 -0.64 5590 2243
1995 -0.013 -1.78 5459 2186
1996 -0.011 -1.51 5177 2043
1997 -0.022 -2.74 5039 1982
1998 -0.002 -0.27 4818 1885
1999 -0.012 -1.54 4732 1878
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to
the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome variable
is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under
analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number
of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19
employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in
1989 are in the control group).
48Table 13: Robustness - Eects on wages and rm perfor-
mance - `All' rms (Dierences-in-Dierences Matching)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Wages
1991 -0.015 -2.57 6749 2606
1992 -0.027 -4.17 6789 2621
1993 -0.028 -3.90 6673 2593
1994 -0.025 -3.46 6709 2606
1995 -0.015 -2.17 6423 2480
1996 -0.028 -3.58 6074 2333
1997 -0.028 -3.56 5959 2293
1998 -0.023 -2.96 5673 2195
1999 -0.014 -1.72 5581 2174
Sales per worker
1991 0.014 0.81 5662 2181
1992 0.035 1.88 5615 2181
1993 0.035 1.67 5564 2160
1994 0.027 1.26 5328 2067
1995 0.039 1.68 4989 1914
1996 0.056 2.34 4779 1829
1997 0.037 1.48 4618 1772
1998 0.026 0.97 4522 1752
1999 0.008 0.30 4454 1749
Surplus per worker
1991 0.030 1.47 5457 2115
1992 0.042 1.93 5406 2109
1993 0.025 1.04 5295 2056
1994 0.024 0.90 5106 1979
1995 0.035 1.27 4808 1846
1996 0.049 1.74 4581 1753
1997 0.023 0.81 4455 1701
1998 0.031 1.04 4360 1682
1999 0.006 0.21 4305 1684
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables consid-
ered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome
variable is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the
year under analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the
number of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10
to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees
in 1989 are in the control group).
49Table 14: Robustness - Eects on job and worker 
ows - `Per-
manent' rms (10-40) (Dierences-in-Dierences Matching, `Per-
manent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Net job creation rate
1991 0.006 0.66 3491 2292
1992 0.003 0.41 3316 2198
1993 0.009 1.16 3325 2186
1994 0.021 2.11 3344 2197
1995 0.016 2.00 3243 2156
1996 0.014 1.63 3122 2006
1997 0.022 2.57 3037 1970
1998 0.004 0.45 2889 1879
1999 0.017 1.87 2854 1851
1991 0.008 1.48 3491 2292
Hirings rate
1992 0.012 2.30 3316 2198
1993 0.011 2.10 3325 2186
1994 0.015 2.67 3344 2197
1995 0.009 1.57 3243 2156
1996 0.005 0.82 3122 2006
1997 0.013 1.84 3037 1970
1998 0.006 0.94 2889 1879
1999 0.011 1.68 2854 1851
1991 0.002 0.28 3491 2292
Separations rate
1992 0.009 1.44 3316 2198
1993 0.002 0.23 3325 2186
1994 -0.006 -0.74 3344 2197
1995 -0.007 -0.98 3243 2156
1996 -0.009 -1.17 3122 2006
1997 -0.009 -1.05 3037 1970
1998 0.002 0.27 2889 1879
1999 -0.007 -0.77 2854 1851
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers to
the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables considered
and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome variable
is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the year under
analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the number
of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10 to 19
employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees in
1989 are in the control group).
50Table 15: Robustness - Eects on wages and rm perfor-
mance - `Permanent' rms (10-40) (Dierences-in-Dierences
Matching, `Permanent' Firms)
Variable Year ATT t(ATT) Treated Control
Wages
1991 -0.019 -2.98 3903 2487
1992 -0.030 -4.24 3929 2480
1993 -0.035 -4.45 3874 2470
1994 -0.033 -4.02 3893 2491
1995 -0.025 -3.23 3724 2388
1996 -0.036 -3.99 3530 2235
1997 -0.037 -4.15 3483 2228
1998 -0.030 -3.44 3312 2125
1999 -0.025 -2.80 3276 2077
Sales per worker
1991 0.033 1.77 3278 2078
1992 0.030 1.50 3262 2063
1993 0.037 1.68 3218 2061
1994 0.000 0.02 3083 1986
1995 0.026 1.11 2895 1847
1996 0.033 1.32 2780 1779
1997 0.022 0.84 2675 1711
1998 0.052 1.90 2627 1666
1999 0.027 1.01 2588 1668
Surplus per worker
1991 0.056 2.44 3170 2019
1992 0.049 2.07 3143 2000
1993 0.032 1.24 3074 1960
1994 0.014 0.50 2957 1902
1995 0.030 1.00 2797 1777
1996 0.023 0.73 2668 1703
1997 0.020 0.63 2582 1635
1998 0.080 2.45 2536 1600
1999 0.036 1.12 2502 1608
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal. ATT refers
to the average treatment on the treated in terms of the outcome variables consid-
ered and at the year under analysis. t(ATT) denotes the t-ratio. The outcome
variable is measured by the dierence between the value of the variable in the
year under analysis and the base year, 1989. Treatment and Control indicates the
number of rms in the treatment and control groups respectively (rms with 10
to 19 employees in 1989 are in the treatment group; rms with 21 to 30 employees
in 1989 are in the control group).
51